November 10, 2023

Week 11 Notes

Plan:

Introduction

I. Picturing (broken down as in the diagram).

II. Including Ramsification, *within* the CSP vocabulary, i.e. both Ramsified and realizing vocabularies are in CSP, though different things are described: natural linguistic objects (sign designs) and their regularities, for Ramsified, and material nonlinguistic objects pictured, for realizers. [Explain Ramsification and the Canberra Program.]

Introduction:

Intro: On Conceptual Appearances.

Though Sellars himself frames his discussion (in Chapter V of *SM*) largely by reference to the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus*, the figure most important for his thought here, as elsewhere, is Kant.
Plato is important in reminding us how and why Kant's problem is new.

Looking back, we can see that part of the metaconceptual change from understanding the appearance/reality distinction using the notion of resemblance to understanding it using (an evolving) categories of representation, was to open up a line of thought that does not become explicit until Kant.
That is **the idea of specifically *conceptual* appearances of a *non*conceptual reality**.
The original home language-game of the distinction is in *sensuous* appearances: perceptual appearances of perceptible things.

Extending the idea of *perceptual* appearances to that of *conceptual* appearances (not, as in Plato, of conceptual realities) is a second nontrivial move, in addition to the resemblance→representation move.
It is one culmination of the move to categories of representation.
In Kant, we have the idea of conceptual appearances of nonconceptual things-in-themselves.
This is the origin of *transcendental semantics*.
Like Sellars, Kant, too, distinguishes this transcendental sense of 'appearance' (conceptual appearances of things not in conceptual shape) from an empirical sense, in which intuitions that are already in a this-such sort of conceptual state ("there is only one unity") are synthesized and rationally unified by being brought under conceptual rules into judgmental form.

Simonelli is a good guide here.
His lucid essay uses Strawson's Kant book, *The Bounds of Sense* as a foil.

1. Strawson offers a "**two-worlds**" reading of Kant's distinction between phenomenal appearances and noumenal things-in-themselves.

This is, roughly, an ***ontological* reading**, that sees appearances and the real things in themselves as two different *kinds* of things.

This contrasts with a "**two-aspects**" reading, in which the one kind of thing there is is considered in the one case in relation to our cognitive capacities, and in the other case apart from any consideration of how we can know about such things.

This is, roughly, an ***epistemological*** reading.

Since Henry **Allison** first championed it, it has become dominant, though not without contemporary dissenters.

2. **Strawson** reads Kant as a phenomenalist in a classical sense: **appearances are specifically *sensory* appearances**. Concepts are used to organize sense impressions (sensuous intuitions) into objects with properties and standing in lawlike relations to one another.

Against this background, Simonelli makes two important points:

3. **Sellars**, too, **has a two-worlds** view.

This is the main interpretive claim of the essay.

But to understand what is distinctive about Sellars's two-worlds view, it is important to see that his Kant differs *radically* from Strawson's Kant in that that Sellars's Kant understands *appearances* as specifically *conceptual* appearances. Even sensuous intuitions (as "this-such"s) are already in conceptual shape.

4. **Sellars's Kant is trying to understand a world of appearance, that is through and through *conceptually* structured, in relation to a world of things-in-themselves that are *not* conceptually structured**.

Here we mustn't be misled by the privileged Peircean conceptual rendering of things in themselves on Sellars's scientific realism version of Kant's transcendental idealism.

His *nominalism* about what is expressed by alethic modal vocabulary, and his consequent nominalistic rejection of *facts* or *propositions*—indeed, of *properties* and *relations*—means that **the world as it is in itself, for Sellars, is a *nonconceptual* world**.

He must understand the commonsense appearance of the world, including as construed by our best contemporary natural science, as a *conceptual* rendering—in terms of facts, relations, and laws—of a thoroughly *non*conceptual reality consisting exclusively of material particulars, which can be considered singly or plurally. (We haven't yet looked into that notion of plural particulars: that's for next time.)

Descartes's running together of conceptually articulated sentential thoughts and sensuously articulated images under the heading of "pensées", "cogitationes", or just represenations kept this issue from arising in the pre-Kantian Early Modern period.

As Kant observed, both Rationalists like **Leibniz** and Empiricists like **Hume** responded to Descartes's assimilation by envisaging **a continuum, with conceptual thoughts at one end and sensuous images at the other**.

Whether you thought of **sense impressions as confused, indistinct, muddled thoughts,** or of **thoughts as faint, thin impressions, from which important distinguishing features have been omitted**, there was not general structural issue comparable to the one Kant faces:

How is *conceptual* knowledge of a *non*conceptual reality intelligible?

How can it be anything other than a falsification?

This is the question **Hegel** asks on Kant's behalf in the opening paragraphs of the *Introduction* to the *Phenomenology*:

"For if knowledge is the instrument to take hold of the absolute essence, one is immediately reminded that the application of an instrument to a thing does not leave the thing as it is, but brings about a shaping and alteration of it.

Or, if knowledge is not an instrument for our activity, but a more or less passive medium through which the light of truth reaches us, then again we do not receive this truth as it is in itself, but as it is in and through this medium.

In both cases we employ a means which immediately brings about the opposite of its own end; or, rather, the absurdity lies in our making use of any means at all.

To be sure, it does seem that an acquaintance with the way the instrument functions might help overcome this difficulty.

For then it would seem possible to get the truth in its purity simply by subtracting from the result the instrument's part in that representation of the absolute which we have gained through it.

In fact, however, this correction would only lead us back to our point of departure.

For

[i], if we remove from a thing which has been shaped by an instrument the contribution of that instrument to it, then the thing (in this case the absolute) is for us exactly as it was before this now obviously superfluous effort. Or

[ii], were the absolute only to be brought a bit *closer* to us by an instrument, perhaps as a bird is trapped by a limetwig, without being changed at all, it would surely laugh at this ruse if it were not, in and for itself, already close to us of its own accord. For in this case knowledge itself would be a ruse, pretending through its multifarious effort to do something other than merely bring forth a relation which is immediate and thus effortless. Or

[iii], if the examination of knowledge, which we now represent as a medium, makes us acquainted with the law of light- refraction in the medium, it is likewise useless to subtract this factor from the result; for knowledge, through which the truth touches us, is the ray of light itself rather than its refraction; and if this be subtracted, we would be left with no more than an indication of pure direction or empty place."

Hegels response is that such a picture leads inevitably to skepticism, in the form of denying that the idea knowledge of things as they really are is so much as intelligible.
His solution: we have to understand reality as it is in itself as already in conceptual form, no less than thought or talk about it.

Notice that **Plato**, who, as Simonelli reminds us, is the original "two-worlder", faces no such issue. For although he distinguishes the sensuous material world from the intelligible world grasped in thought, for him the conceptually structured world of thought *is* the real, and the sensuous world is merely its appearance.

The idea of conceptual appearances is the idea of a distinctive kind of *misunderstanding*, so, state of understanding. But not a simple misunderstanding, in the sense of a disagreement about matters of fact. The idea of conceptual appearances, some of which are *mere* appearances, while others are more or less veridical, is of a deeper, more systematic sort of misunderstanding. In Kant's case, the idea that *understanding* (Verstand) is itself a kind of *mis*understanding, in a wider sense of misprision. In the end, Hegel agrees.
The notion of ideology is downstream from this concern, made more specific than suspicion of the conceptual as such.

Perspective:
Specifically *visual* appearances went through a revolution that was part of the advent of modernity in the West: the mastery of visual *perspective*.
There is
A way of understanding Kant is as taking *us* to have only *one* perspective on things-in-themselves (i.e. nonperspectivally considered or specified).
One reading of Hegel has him endorsing ordered *sequences* of *conceptual* perspective-kinds.

If the idea of conceptual *appearances* is to be adapted in the form of the idea that *conceptual schemes* (we'll have a candidate for specifying them) provide *perspectives* on what they let us know about or understand, there are some fairly definite criteria of adequacy specifying what else you must entitle yourself to say in order to justify talk of "conceptual perspectives."
This is what I talk about in the Moore review.
In particular, one must:

a) Be able to specify *positions* (not just places, but parameterized places—with what, when Descartes gives us the tools to express it so, we will see as positions being places specified by co-ordinate systems) in the conceptual *space* that is being analogized to the three-dimensional space of visual perspective.

ii) Be able to specify how things at one position look from things at another: specify the perspectival view or appearance.
iii) Be able to say how the perspectival view of from one point of view *varies systematically* with the position of the point of view.
One substantial aspiration is to use the apparatus of implication spaces (and perhaps, the commitment-spaces that pair them with sets of doxastic commitments to accept/reject to form new points) to give a precise and useful inferential sense to the conceptual-appearances in the specific form of conceptual *perspectives*.

Point of discussion of move from perceptual to conceptual appearances is to motivate drilling down further into the relationship between conceptual schemes and the reality of which they are conceptual appearances.

So **last time I talked about the purely *conceptual* aspect of the sequence of *appearances*—in particular the judgments of relative, comparative adequacy and *progress*.**
But, as the diagram will indicate, ultimately that progress is to be understood in terms of greater accuracy of picturing. And *that* is supposed to be, in a certain specific sense, a *non*conceptual, merely matter-of-factual affair.
It is, in a certain sense, not relative to a conceptual scheme, even though it is specified in CSP.
The role of CSP, and the intricate interdigitation of conceptual and nonconceptual considerations in using CSP to determine reality, and using reality to assess the comparative adequacy of conceptual schemes, is our topic today.

The ways in which the metaconcepts of <u>picturing</u> and <u>conceptual schemes</u> must be understood together (I would say 'interdigitate', but that suggests a bad structural model of the interdependence) according to heading #2 from last week:

Sellars's Program:

- Assess **conceptual progress** by better *picturing* of the real, and
- Define the **real** by a conceptual scheme that pictures *ideally* well.

These look suspiciously circular.

The initial suspicion can be dispelled, but there is *something* fishy about this strategy.
according to this scheme is the next level of analysis of Sellars's view.
Adapting point (2) from the Plan of last week:
I have suggested that:

a) He needs a notion of <u>conceptual progress</u> that is specifiable at the level of conceptual schemes. I suggested that this could be done *retrospectively*, as it must be, defending against the danger of *self-congratulatory* but intuitively degenerating developments by insisting on maintaining *prospectively* assessable comparisons of what in that sense count as *technological* capabilities, as checks on *explanatory* progress.
b) To entitle oneself to have made sense of the idea of a Peircean *ideal* conceptual scheme for control and explanation of material things, need a representation of conceptual schemes suitable for defining a notion of *convergent* development. I did not offer one, but suggested that Quine's objection that "convergence is defined for numbers, not theories" underestimates the mathematical possibilities. I'll offer a more concrete constructive response to this issue in Week 13, in the form of *implication-space* model-theoretic semantic representations of what Sellars calls "conceptual schemes or frameworks."
c) In that context, can *define* what one means by (a specific sense of) '*real*' by the ideal Peircean explanatory conceptual framework. This scheme by definition *pictures* things as they are. It is ideal along the dimension of *picturing* as well as along the *conceptual* dimension.

This is the second point above:

- Define the **real** by a conceptual scheme that pictures *ideally* well.

d) At that point, we can make sense of the *earlier*, *less adequate* conceptual frameworks as *also picturing* what there really is, but less adequately.
We will now be entitled to say that the notion of conceptual progress that we appealed to in our first step, (a), corresponds to progress in the sense of *more adequate picturing*, relative to and assessed by the standards of the ideal Peircean conceptual framework.
This is the first point above:

- Assess **conceptual progress** by better *picturing* of the real

To move from steps (a) and (b), which I discussed last time, to steps (c) and (d), we need to understand the concept of picturing. That is where the crucial (from a Kantian perspective) interface between the *conceptual* and the *non*conceptual, material, actual, matter-of-factual objective reality is put in place *metaconceptually*—that is, in Sellars account of reality and conceptual progress.
This is what the Picturing Diagram aims to illuminate.
"Linguistic picture-making is not the performance of asserting matter-of-factual performances. The *criterion* [BB: cf. rules of *criticism*] of the correctness of the performance of asserting a basic matter-of-factual proposition is the correctness of the proposition *qua* picture, i.e. the fact that it coincides with **the picture the world-cum-language would generate in accordance with the uniformities [normatively] controlled by the semantical rules of the language**. Thus the *correctness* of the picture is not defined in terms of the *correctness* of the performance, but vice versa." [136, §57]

One useful analytical tool in this enterprise is **the distinction between *sense*-dependence between concepts and *reference*-dependence.** (I introduced this distinction a few weeks ago. Here's another situation where it can help clarify some issues.)
[Rehearse the distinction, with model of subjunctively response-dependent properties, which are sense-dependent, but not reference-dependent on the actual existence of the things they are dependent on.]
I'm heading for the nonconceptual because matter-of-factual pictur*ing*s, pictur*ed*s, and the relation between them—but still ultimately understood in terms of the Peircish *conceptual scheme*, which is supposed to be *assessed* by its ideality as *picturing*, in matter-of-factual terms. So long as Peircish is *defined*, the reference is fixed, in pragmatist terms of justificatory assessments and practices, then since the real that is pictured by linguistic sign-design picturings is understood as specified in Peircish conceptual terms, the matter-of-factual is being *defined* by its relation to something picked out in conceptual terms. (Of course the whole discussion is in and about concepts, but that is not the point.)
But that dependence of matter-of-factual on conceptually articulated is a matter of the terms used in *definition*, *specification*, and *reference-fixing*—of terms like 'real', 'best picturing'.
That is a matter of *sense* dependence, not *reference* dependence.

I) Picturing:

A. Diagram, and Discussion of It. Picturing Treated as a Black Box.



a) Last week I talked about the relations between current, previous, and subsequent conceptual frameworks for describing and explaining the antics of material things (eventually, in Sellars's ontologically nominalist setting, material *particulars* and 'groups' of them), on the one hand, and the ideal Peircean theoretical material object vocabulary.

It is that vocabulary that appears **on the right of our diagram, vertically**.

That is the vocabulary in which we are to envisage *picturing relations* being specified.

b) The **relata** at both ends of that picturing relation are accordingly to be understood as constellations or arrangements of material particulars.

c) What is **pictur*ed*** is arrangements of nonlinguistic material objects: in the diagram, such particulars as lions, mammals, and reptiles—where all the lions are mammals, and none of the lions are reptiles.

Exactly how we are to understand the 'wholes' of particulars that I have called 'constellations' or 'arrangements' of them is a question I want to largely pass over for the moment. We'll return to it next week.

d) To understand the pictur*ings* that are at the other (top) end of the picturing relation, we need to consider the relations portrayed at the top of the diagram, in the horizontal box. These are specified in a ***pragmatic*** *metavocabulary*: a vocabulary for ***saying*** **what we** ***do*** **when we** ***say*** **things**: in this particular case, when we *describe* material things.

e) On the **left-hand** side of the diagram are norm-governed conceptual contents: the ***meanings*** **expressed by** ***using*** **linguistic items** to make claims and challenge and defend them with reasons, citing the applicability of some descriptive terms as *reasons explaining* the applicability of some other descriptive terms.
Look closely, and you'll see that I've enclosed the linguistic expressions on the left-hand side of this relation in ***dot-quotes***, indicating how they are *functionally classified*, the **roles** they play in broadly inferential relations of implication and incompatibility, corresponding to language-language moves by which reasons are given, and further claims are justified and explained.

f) Furthermore, the dot-quoted expressions themselves are DSTs that *contain* tokenings of the sort we find on the right-hand side of the diagram, as sign-designs.

g) These relations of implication and incompatibility are specified in a *normative* vocabulary that enables one to say what moves are and are not appropriate or obligatory, what would *commit* one or *entitle* one to apply the descriptive expressions in question.

h) On the **right-hand** side of the diagram at the top are the linguistic expressions whose *use* is codified on the left-hand side.
Look closely, and you will see that I've enclosed the expressions in **ordinary quotation marks**, which let us talk about the expressions themselves.
Here Sellars wants us to think of the *expressions used* in discourse as "natural linguistic objects" or what he calls "sign designs." These correspond to what Wittgenstein is after when he talks about "**the sign-post considered just as a piece of wood**," apart from its meaning *as* a sign-post, due to the role it plays in social practices of guiding and being followed by those who understand it *as* a sign-post.

i) **Principle** governing the relations between the left- and right-hand sides of the rectangle at the top of the diagram:
Norms governing the rational **use** of expressions (to give reasons for and against other claimables) **"induce regularities"** in the matter-of-factual relations among the sign-designs ("languagings", "natural linguistic objects")
(In the diagram, rounded ellipses correspond to norm-governed conceptual contents, and rectangles correspond to material particulars and matter-of-factual relations among them.

j) The natural linguistic objects or sign-designs at the upper right **lead two lives**, one as vehicles of *conceptual content* and the other as *material particulars*, tokenings that stand in *causal-explanatory* relations to other episodes or events.

k) I want to explain the norms-induce-regularities principle in two stages:
First, the way I think it is best thought of, bracketing Sellars's *modal nominalism*, and

Second, taking account of his extrusion of modally robust relations from "the world in the narrow sense" that excludes anything metalinguistic or specifiable only in terms of discursive practices.

i. Specified in the richer metavocabulary, **the reason-relations of implication and incompatibility** that govern the justification and challenging of descriptive claims and in virtue of which the expressions used to make those claims are intelligible as conceptually contentful **are specified in a normative, specifically deontic MV**. In that deontic modal MV, one says when one commitment entitles one to further commitments, and precludes entitlement to other commitments.
In virtue of being used according to practices governed by those normative relations, the actual sign-designs that are uttered in accepting and rejecting claimables, and defending and challenging them with reasons, stand to one another in subjunctively robust relations: if a sign-design of *this* kind *were* produced, a sign-design of this other kind *would* be produced, and sign designs of these further kinds would *not* be produced.
The normative inclusions and exclusions of conceptual contents are mirrored (albeit darkly and incompletely) by subjunctively robust dependencies and exclusions of concrete instances of utterance-kinds.

ii. Now I have expressed this conceptual-norms-induce-regularities-of-utterance in terms of a correlation between dependencies among conceptual contents, expressed in a deontic normative MV and subjunctively robust dependencies among the occurrences of material sign-designs of various matter-of-factual kinds.
I wanted to get this picture on the table now because I will revert to this pairing of what is expressed in deontic normative and alethic modal MVs as part of the constructive alternative story to Sellars's that I will sketch in our meeting two weeks from now. But Sellars describes the situation differently.
Since Sellars thinks of alethic modal vocabulary as metalinguistic (in a unique sense: codifying rules of reasoning), and hence as not in the world in the narrow sense captured by expressions for material particulars in the Peircean ideal descriptive vocabulary, **he does not talk about *subjunctively robust dependencies*, but about mere *regularities*** in the occurrence of sign-design tokenings.
Here the relevant contrast is the Humean one, between modally oomphy *lawlike* relations, which support subjunctive and counterfactual reasoning, and *mere* regularities (Hume's "constant conjunction").

l) There is an idealization here, because

i. **Errors**: Practitioners do not always follow their own norms perfectly. We make mistakes, accept claims we are not entitled to and reject some we are committed to accept.

ii. **Omissions**: We don't acknowledge all the consequences of our commitments—what else they oblige us or forbid us to accept or reject.

To understand the pictur*ing* sign-design side of the picturing relation, we are to imagine the error-ridden and massively incomplete reflection of our conceptual norms in actual production of sign-designs as it would be if it were *not* afflicted by these limitations.

***If* the subjunctive dependencies (regularities) relating the worldly material objects *were* different, the subjunctive dependencies relating the natural linguistic objects *would have been* different**.

The matter-of-factual regularities exhibited by the natural linguistic objects are to *track* the matter-of-factual regularities exhibited by the nonlinguistic material objects, in a subjunctively robust way. Just how to cash out that subjunctive-dependency of subjunctive dependencies—the subjunctive meta-dependency that is picturing, is apparently a delicate matter.

Still, *this* vertical relation, of matter-of-factual, subjunctively robust *picturing*, relating two sets of subjunctively robust dependencies, is easier to specify than the horizontal relation between a set of *normative* relations between conceptual contents and matter-of-factual subjunctive dependencies (regularities) exhibited by natural linguistic material objects, which is invoked by the principle that "norms induce regularities." For that one, the subjunctive conditionals expressing the "inducing" relation, must also be specified in alethic modal vocabulary:

***If* the norms determining the inferential functional roles played by or conceptual contents expressed by the use of these natural linguistic material objects *were* (or had been) different, the matter-of-factual subjunctive dependencies among those natural linguistic material objects *would be* (or would have been) different.**

Here the overall metavocabulary is alethic modal, suitable for expressing subjunctive dependencies. But what it expresses subjunctive dependencies *between* is *normatively* specified functional roles (normative or deontic dependencies) and alethically specified matter-of-factual subjunctive dependencies. Once again we have subjunctive metadependencies relating constellations of dependencies, but the modalities of the dependencies are different in this case.

We have *hetero*modal subjunctive (alethic modal) dependencies in (ii), by contrast to the *homo*modal subjunctive (alethic modal) dependencies in (iv).

It is here, in the heteromodal case of "norms inducing regularities," I am now thinking, that **the fact that functional roles = conceptual contents are specified using DSTs formed by dot-quoting illustrating tokenings is crucially important. For that distinctive mode of specification gives us a specification of conceptual contents by means of or in terms of sample displayed natural linguistic material objects (tokenings)**. The principle connecting those displayed illustrating tokenings to other tokenings (in the same or other vocabularies) is normative through and through. But each dot-quoted specification of a conceptual content comes with at least one example of a natural linguistic object whose regularities are to be understood as "induced" by the norms governing its use.

Now (at last) we are in a position to **consider the picturing relation itself**: on the right-hand side of the diagram.

B. Picturing Unpacked:

1. Breaking down picturing into its components:
   a) First element is a *method of projection*.
   b) It relates *regularities* of pictured items to *regularities* of picturing items.
   c) The regularities of picturing items are *induced by norms* governing the production of picturing items.
   d) I think Sellars uses 'regularity' here to make contact with what Hume *did* believe he could make sense of: regularities, not laws. This A is a B. All observed As are Bs. Not: All As are necessarily Bs, or If this *were* an A it *would be* a B.
   e) Picturing is an asymmetric relation, so not an identity relation.
   f) Picturing is a *holistic* relation. It is one whole *system* of picturing items that pictures a whole *system* of pictured items. What articulates the systems is matter-of-factual regularities relating pictured items to pictured items, matter-of-factual regularities (induced by norms) relating picturing items. What gets established is a holistic set of regularities relating pictured and picturing items.
   g) Offer a *functionalist* understanding of these picturing relations, elaborated using David Lewis's Ramsification-plus-best-realizers conception of functionalism, and my construal of that as relating two different *vocabularies*: one that is Ramsified, to produce (holistic) specifications of functional roles, and the other of which is recruited to potential realizers of those functional roles. A third component is the comparative assessment of *better* realizers, and move from comparative to superlative *best* realizers (a kind of move the complexities of which we are now sensitized to, after the discussion last week).

2. Picturing essentially involves:
   i) An isomorphism,
   ii) Between constellations of natural linguistic particulars ("sign designs") and material objects, that is
   iii) Induced and sustained in a subjunctively sensitive way, by
   iv) Causal relations between regularities of use of expressions,
   v) Which themselves reflect norms of criticism ("ought-to-be"s).
   vi) Such isomorphisms allow tracking of reference-like relations (correlations of natural linguistic objects and material objects) across changes in conceptual framework.

Sellars thinks that picturing is a transcendental requirement on any language (Seiberth 142)
I.5) Picturing itself must be;

a) **a matter-of-factual relationship**, so independent of all but the Peircean ideal conceptual schemes (constellations of conceptually articulated statable, inferable conceptual contents). The picturing relation between languagings and nonlanguaging particulars is *thought of* as expressed in the Peircean vocabulary. But what *it* describes *and* pictures—inerrantly, though incompletely, because picturing is a homomophism mapping the picturings *into* the pictureds.

But this isn't right: the *method of projection*, which includes *possible* (licit in the picturing vocabulary) languagings as picturing actual groupings of particulars, objects, events, processes *can* be an isomorphism.
Saying that requires that the *method of projection* be specifiable in the CSP terms of material particulars.
Here, I think, **the prohibition on *subjunctive dependencies* in favor of *mere regularities***—which I take it are defined by the prohibition of the use, in the specifying vocabulary, of alethic modal expressions, paradigmatically conditionals in the subjunctive mood—**undercuts the notion of a *method* of projection**.
Here is where the point of *maps*, thought of as used by exploiting a systematic constellation of implications of *terrain facts* by *map facts*, can be appealed to. In particular, in that paradigmatic case of picturing, the implications are *subjunctively robust*: we can exploit the correlations between the distance between the dots and the distance between the cities in implications about *counterfactual* statements of map and terrain facts, implications about what *would* follow about the terrain if the map *were* different.

a) **Picturing *must* be the correlation of what would be made explicit by subjunctive conditionals on the pictur*ing* side with what would be made explicit by subjunctive conditionals on the pictur*ed* side**.
I think both are to be construed as '**this-such's, restricted to "material objects.**" That last is to say that they are specified in a material-object vocabulary. Specifically, one imagines, it must be the Peircean vocabulary, which considers the pictur*ing* material objects *just as* material objects, abstracting from their role as natural *linguistic* objects or *sign* designs. To know *which* material objects ('this-such's) and *which* subjunctively robust covariances among them matter on the pictur*ing* side we must consult the *pragmatic meta*vocabulary in which the *inducing* of matter-of-factual regularities relating what show up *there as* natural *linguistic* objects by governing, meaning-articulating *norms* (rules of criticism, ought-to-bes) is formulated. But all that is merely propadeutic to (a ladder that, having been climbed to this level can be discarded) the specification of the subjunctively robust correlation of subjunctively robust dependencies that is the picturing relation as it appears in the CSP framework.
We can say a bit more about this final correlation. It must be a *homo*morphism, not an *iso*morphism, since there is so much more going on in the world than is reflected in even linguistic dispositions. So the *inferences* (implications) that articulate the mapping

relation must be *from* subjunctive linguistic dependences *to* subjunctive merely-worldly dependences: *if* speakers are disposed, upon producing *this* sort of NLO (in fact amounting to a commitment to accept *p*) *not* to produce *that* sort of NLO (which in fact would be the denial of *q*, which follows from *p*), *then* the p-this-such excludes the q-incompatible this-such.

It follows that, in order to codify picturing relations, the CSP conceptual framework *must* make possible subjunctively robust *explanatory* relations among its descriptions. Explaining is still something people will *do* in *using* the CSP vocabulary. But that feature of their *doing* (specified in a pragmatic MV) will not be taken to represent any ultimate feature of the reality they both describe and explain. For they will understand the pragmatic *metalinguistic* character of that aspect of their practice. The nature they describe will not *contain laws* of nature, though they will reason in subjunctively robust ways. *That* feature of their *practice*, the practice of *understanding*, is what is expressed, misleadingly, in looking for "laws" underlying their practice *in* the reality they are describing and explaining.

II) **Ramsification**

Including Ramsification, *within* the CSP vocabulary, i.e. both Ramsified and realizing vocabularies are in CSP, though different things are described: natural linguistic objects (sign designs) and their regularities, for Ramsified, and material nonlinguistic objects pictured, for realizers. [Explain Ramsification and the Canberra Program.]

Comparison of conceptual frameworks as better-or-worse at picturing the particulars of the ideal Peircean conceptual framework CSP construed on Lewisian functionalist model of

1. Ramsification of the pictur*ing* framework.
2. Selection of best realizers from the pictur*ed* framework, CSP.
3. $CS_i < CS_j$ along the dimension of picturing (better appearance) of *reality* as identified with CSP iff CSP provides *better realizers* of Ramsified CS_j roles than it does of Ramsified CS_i roles.

The key issues with the Ramsification strategy are how to sort what predicates and terms one replaces with variables, and what predicates and terms one leaves in the resulting multiply existentially quantified frame. Whatever is left unRamsified must be vocabulary *common* to both the interpreted and the interpreting vocabulary. In this case, given Sellars's commitments, we can count on the spatio-temporal vocabulary being common and the logical vocabulary of conditionals and negation, which codifies material relations of implication and incompatibility. All the other positions will be replaced by predicate-variables and term-variables, and then replaced by instantiators (realizers) drawn from the CSP vocabulary.

The factors that determine what set of substituends are "better realizers" are when the CSP terms and predicates are substituted for the CSi terms and predicates, how many of the sentences codifying implications and incompatibilities turn out to be true in CSP? (Not *quoad* CSP: that is what we are defining.)

3. On the Canberra Plan: (Panu Raatikainen)

Schematically, the program can be described as proceeding, in the case of any particular concept or family of concepts to be analyzed, in three steps.

First, the theory essential for the concepts at hand must be identified. In the case of theoretical scientific concepts, one focuses on the scientific theory ("the canonical theory") in the context in which these concepts are first introduced ("defined"). In the case of common sense or philosophical concepts, the "platitudes" concerning the concepts of interest are collected together; these are the relevant truths about the topic that most competent speakers (perhaps implicitly) believe. They constitute the "folk theory" of the area. **The idea in either case is that the relevant theory "implicitly defines" the concepts at stake by defining their theoretical role**.

Second, the theory—be it a scientific theory or a folk theory—is formalized. Furthermore, the vocabulary of the theory is somehow divided into *internal theoretical* terms (*T*-

terms), introduced by the theory, and *observational*, *old*, or *outsider* terms (*O*-terms), which derive their meaning in some way external to the theory. The former are then "Ramsey-eliminated" or "Ramsified," and the Ramsey sentence and the Carnap sentence of the theory are achieve. The idea is that **the Ramsified variant of the theory—that is, the Ramsey sentence of the theory—reveals the theoretical role of these concepts of interest**.

Third, we look at the world (or our best current theory of it) in order to find out what in reality plays the role just described—that is, **what realizes it**. In this final phase, empirical science plays the main role. The earlier steps, in contrast, are done "in the armchair" by philosophers and, according to the advocates of the plan, result in *a priori* knowledge or conceptual truths.

In addition, at least Lewis (1994), and especially Jackson and Chalmers (Jackson 1994a, b, 1998; Chalmers 1996, 2012; Chalmers and Jackson 2001), take it that all this provides in particular an *a priori* entailment from microphysical truths to all ordinary macro-level truths (except perhaps phenomenal consciousness)

To begin with, the Ramsey sentence approach presupposes the division of the (non-logical) language of the particular theory *S* at stake into two mutually exclusive classes: Ramsey himself talked only abstractly about "the primary system" and "the secondary system." Carnap, however, related this framework explicitly to the orthodox *observational-theoretical* distinction in the philosophy of science, and this has been since then the standard interpretation. Finally, although Lewis also aimed to define *theoretical terms*, he was more critical toward the traditional observational-theoretical dichotomy, and preferred to call the expressions in the former class just "old terms" or "original terms"—or simply "*O*-terms." The latter are, in Lewis' understanding, terms which are already understood, whereas theoretical terms—*T*-terms—are the new terms introduced with the theory in question. An "*O*-sentence" is a sentence that does not contain any *T*-terms, and any sentence that contains *T*-terms (it may also contain *O*-terms) is a "*T*-sentence." In the beginning (in Lewis 1970), Lewis' focus was on theoretical terms in science, but the later Lewis and Canberra Planners often interpret "theoretical" very widely to include all sorts of concepts occurring in philosophy and folk theories. Nevertheless, the framework of the philosophy of science has served as a model here.

The standard Ramsey sentence approach focuses on theoretical *predicates* and related *second-order variables*. Lewis, by contrast, actually considered explicitly only *individual constants*, or *singular terms*, and *first-order variables*. However, it is important to recognize that the standard approach does *not* thereby assume the full-blown second-order logic; in reality only a two-sorted first-order language is used. In fact, Lewis himself contends that we can focus on singular names *because* some names can be assumed to denote *properties*, *relations* or *classes*; and that some amount of *set theory* is in any case necessarily required (Lewis 1970, p. 429). And if so, it is no more problematic to include predicates and predicate variables interpreted extensionally as denoting sets of individuals and sets of ordered-pairs (and *n*-tuples) of individuals. The more standard setting of Ramsey sentences with "second-order" variables and quantifiers is not a single bit more metaphysically committed, but simply makes things more transparent. There is a simple translation between the standard two-sorted and Lewis' one-sorted framework, and it is more a matter of convenience which one is used. Moreover, once we have theoretical predicates, singular terms can be subsumed under them: simply define $T_t(x) \leftrightarrow_{df} (x = \mathbf{t})$. Consequently, in what follows, the focus is on the standard general approach involving theoretical predicates.

Now the central idea of the Ramsey–Carnap–Lewis method is the following: Assume that the theory *S* is presented in a standard form with theoretical *T*-predicates $T_1, T_2, \ldots, T_n$, and observational/old *O*-predicates $O_1, O_2, \ldots, O_n$. The Ramsey sentence S^R of *S* is obtained by first replacing all the theoretical predicates with distinct second-order

variables, and then, to the result of this replacement, prefixing the existential quantifiers with respect to those second order variables. Thus, if the original theory *S* is written as

S(*T*1, *T*2, . . . , *Tn*, *O*1, *O*2, . . . , *On*),

then the Ramsey sentence *S*R of *S* is:

(∃*X*1)(∃*X*2) ・ ・ ・ (∃*Xn*)*S*(*X*1, *X*2, . . . , *Xn*, *O*1, *O*2, . . . , *On*).

After Ramsey's initial suggestion, others have demonstrated various nice logical properties of Ramsey sentences. Here are some important ones (cf. Psillos 2006):

- *S*R is a logical consequence of *S*.
- *S*R and *S* have exactly the same *O*-sentences as their logical consequences.
- *S*1 and *S*2 have incompatible *O*-consequences if and only if *S*R1 and *S*R2 are incompatible.
- *S*1 and *S*2 may make incompatible *theoretical* assertions, yet *S*R1 and *S*R2 can be compatible.
- If *S*R1 and *S*R2 are compatible with the same *O*-truths, then they are compatible with each other.

Consequently, Ramsey sentences may seem to well suit the purposes of capturing the factual, or synthetic, contents of theories. Lewis (1972, p. 254) notes:

"The Ramsey sentence has exactly the same *O*-content as the postulate [theory] of *T*; any sentence free of *T*-terms follows logically from one if and only if it follows from the other."

Lewis contends that *T*-terms can be defined with the help of *O*-terms and Ramsey sentences involving only the latter, and are thus eliminable. Nevertheless, for him, this does not undermine realism: "I am also *not* planning to '*dispense* with theoretical *entities*.' Quite the opposite. The defining of theoretical terms serves the cause of scientific realism." (Lewis 1970; p. 428; my emphasis) Thus, Lewis does not advocate a radical empiricism in which all there is to the truth of a theory is its empirical adequacy. Presumably, the same is the case with Canberra Planners.

II.5) Transcendental Idealism as Scientific Realism, via Picturing:

Once we have the picturing relation on board, we can go back and check the judgments of progressiveness of conceptual schemes from within the sequence (where I suggested prospective technological assessments could guard against degenerate but self-congratulatory progressive-by-their-own-lights developments).
For now judgments of "better realizers" for projected constellations of natural linguistic objects, with the realizers drawn from the Peircean scheme, *should* mirror the judgments made from *within* the sequence of conceptual schemes.
This permits a *quasi-empirical* confirmation of the comparative assessments that led to identification of the CSP conceptual framework in the first place.
Although Sellars sometimes seems to suggest otherwise, I do *not* think this assessment can be used *in place of* the original assessments of adequacy of conceptual scheme that identify the Peircean framework in the first place.
For *by itself*, the better-picturing criterion does not adequately guard against guard against degenerate but self-congratulatory progressive-by-their-own-lights developments.
(Mind you, none of this will "guard against" such developments socio-politically.
I mean "guard against" our *definition* or *understanding* of progress *certifying* such degenerate but successfully self-congratulatory schemes *as progressive*.

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Notes from Simonelli:
[6]Elsewhere (Simonelli 2021), I've described this basic shape of his philosophical picture (quasi-ironically) as a kind of "Platonism." Plato, of course, is the original two worlds theorist. Generally construed, the crucial idea of Platonism is that there is a fundamental bifurcation between the world of appearances and the reality that underlies those appearances. As I have and will use the two terms**, Sellars's distinctive brand of Kantianism is really nothing other than his distinctive brand of Platonism**.

Let us return to the basic problem of how we can make sense of ourselves as knowing the structure of objective reality if "thinking cannot touch the real." The real, the in itself, is indeed not graspable—at least, it is not graspable in the sense that a conceptual content is graspable. Nevertheless, particular happenings unfold in certain patterns, and our languagings can picture those happenings, as they unfold. Insofar as a picturing relation obtains, the structure of reality can be mediately grasped through grasping the structure of the space of concepts conferred by a linguistic practice that pictures it. So, ultimately, insofar as we are capable of modifying our language and, as a result, our conceptual repertoire through scientific development, it is possible for the world we will conceptually represent in experience to be an appearance of the real world.

And so, though I've spoken of Sellars's picture of the phenomenal and noumenal, the conceptual and the real, as a "two worlds" picture, this claim is best understood as a claim about the phenomenal and the noumenal at our current stage in conceptual development. Though we start out with a conceptual order according to which a two-worlds picture is apt, we may aspire, in doing science, to end up with a conceptual order according to which a two-aspects picture is apt such that we can talk about things in themselves both as we represent them and as they are in themselves. [26]